An innocent blog post demonstrating that it’s trivial for anyone to clearly see passwords in Chrome is slowly building up into a whole scandal. The Chrome team was quick to respond but, unfortunately, that answer simply poured oil on a fire that was already burning quite brightly.
Here are a few predictions:
- As we speak, the Chrome team is having an emergency meeting to discuss the situation.
- Within a few days, they will announce that they are going to fix the problem.
- In a couple of weeks, the next version of Chrome will no longer clearly display passwords without additional action from the user.
- In the months that follow, the other browsers will fall in line and implement a similar fix (Update: Safari already prompts you for your machine password before showing you its passwords. Thanks, Fabrizio, for pointing this out.)
I’m guessing Justin Chuh is probably regretting answering so hastily (you know you’re in hot water when Sir Tim Berners Lee calls your answer “disappointing”) and this might be a good illustration of being immersed into a domain for so many years that you start missing out on obvious things. We’ve all been guilty of this at some point, when our own expertise is reinforcing a flawed premise and that very expertise is preventing us from being critical of that very same premise.
The general idea is that once someone has physical access to a resource you are trying to secure, that resource is pretty much gone so you shouldn’t spend too much time trying to address that scenario.
A common response to this is that once someone gains access to your computer, they can still log into your favorite websites without knowing your passwords, but this is a straw man: the exposure of your passwords in clear text can be devastating since this knowledge can then be used to gain access to many more web sites. If you give me a password cookie, I can only log to so many websites in a few minutes. If you give me your clear text password, I can spend hours back home trying to log in to various websites without worries.
The danger with the “physical access is not worth addressing” premise is that it’s tempting to do absolutely nothing to address this case (which is what most browsers do, Chrome is not the only culprit here) instead of doing at least a minimum. For example, maybe you have some cash in your home that you save for emergencies and you are wondering where to hide it. Just because a burglar inside your house can steal whatever they want at that point doesn’t mean you shouldn’t at least make it a bit harder for them. Surely, hiding that cash inside socks in a drawer is a bit more secure than leaving it in plain sight on the kitchen table.
This added bit of security can be crucial for two reasons:
- It raises the technical bar on the thief. With the current situation, someone who sits down in front of your unlocked workstation can know your passwords within ten seconds and just a few clicks. Hash and hide these passwords and, suddenly, reading them is no longer accessible to a large part of the population.
- Time is also a factor. When someone gains access to your computer, they might only have a few minutes and anything you can do to delay them (such as installing a hash decrypter) is that much more time they don’t have to steal something else.
Whatever happens, I think we will all come out of this situation with more secure browsers.